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I. INTRODUCTION
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, which in common usage is known
as the "Warsaw Convention," was enacted on October 12, 1929, at War-
saw, Poland, during the Second International Conference on Private Air
Law.'
Adherence by the United States Government came on October 29,
1934, thus the Convention became part of the law of the land superseding
any other law in regard to international transportation by air.2
It should be noticed that the draftors of the Convention were pri-
marily from Civil Law Nations; and it was drawn without the partici-
pation of the United States. The French version is the official text of the
Convention and the version officially accepted by the Senate of the United
States.
It is a well-known fact that the primary purpose of the Convention
was to limit the liability for personal injuries to $8,300.00,1 so that in
the 1930's fledgling air carriers could obtain insurance coverage. In this
regard, the Convention has been subject to severe criticisms4 in the
United States. It has been argued that after World War II, the Conven-
tion had outlived its usefulness in the United States and that there was
no longer any reason to maintain such limitation for personal injuries
since the air carriers are now well established enterprises.
The United States began diplomatic negotiations toward -removal of
the liability limitation in the 1950's. However, these efforts culminated
* Doctor in Laws, University of Havana.
1. DELASCIO, MANUAL DEL DERECHO DE LA AViACION 192 (1959).
2. 49 Stat., pt. II 3000 (1929) (hereinafter cited as the Convention).
3. Convention art. 22.
4. Report on the Warsaw Convention as Amended by the Hague Protocol, 26 J. AIR
L. & COM. 255, 267-268 (1959).
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in a compromised amendment to the Warsaw Convention, known as the
Hague Protocol of 1955.5 The Hague Protocol, which has not yet been
ratified by the United States, was an agreement to raise the Warsaw
limitation for personal injuries to $16,600.00. In addition, the Hague
Protocol would introduce language so rigid that it would become vastly
more difficult for passengers-or their estates-to recover damages be-
yond the $16,600.00 limit.' This, of course, has not satisfied the advocates
of unlimited liability in cases of personal injuries.
In 1951, the United States Government referred this matter pre-
liminarily to the Inter-Agency Group on International Aviation (IGIA).
This advisory group, consisting of personnel from various agencies, was
to recommend either the denunciation of the Warsaw Convention or the
ratification of the Hague Protocol. At the end, the IGIA group attempted
to compromise by developing new schemes designed to satisfy both parts
in controversy.7
Presently, however, there is in existence a very strong tendency to
denounce the Warsaw Convention as repugnant to American Law.
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE CONVENTION
Before Wilful Misconduct under Article 25 of the Convention can
be ascertained, applicability of the Convention under Article 1 must first
be considered. This is necessary in every case, since the Convention only
applies to international flights.
The Convention does not look into the nationality of the carrier
or the citizenship of the passengers in order to determine its applicability.'
5. KREinwLER, AViATION ACCIDENT LAW 375 (1963).
6. The Hague Protocol, if ratified, would effect a fundamental change in what is pres-
ently considered the meaning of Wilful Misconduct in the United States. (For the definition
of Wilful Misconduct, see quotation in text at notes 11 and 13, infra.) Article 23 of the
Protocol provides that article 25 of the Convention (see infra note 13) shall be deleted
and replaced by the following:
The limits of liability specified in article 22 shall not .apply if it is proved that the
damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or agents,
done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage
would probably result.
In summary, the Protocol would introduce the same language used by the court in the
Jane Froman case, infra at note 21.
7. Speiser, Memorandum on the Warsaw Convention, The Hague Protocol and the
Igia Recommendations, NACCA L.J. Bar Association (1963).
8. Glenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion, 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952) where
the decedents were being carried as passengers for hire from Miami to Havana, Cuba, and
return. Cuba was not a signatory power. The Court held that "since the purpose and object
of the Convention was to unify rules pertaining to international transportation by air and
not to inquire into the citizenship of any passenger or nationality of the carrier, it was
proper for the defendant air carrier to avail itself of the provisions of the Convention";
Garcia v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 269 App. Div. 287, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317 (2d
Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257 (1946), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 824 (1949);
Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1943), aff'd, 267
App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1st Dep't 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945); Tumar-
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It is, predicated exclusively, upon the place of departure and the place
of destination established within the contract of carriage.
Article 1 of the Convention establishes the limits of what is con-
sidered an international flight. Any flight, in which, according to the
contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination are situated either within the territories of two High Con-
tracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party is deemed an international flight within the provision of this arti-
cle.' Article 1 provides further that if there is an agreed stopping place
within a territory subject to the sovereignty of another Power, the flight
is considered an international flight even though that Power is not a party
to this Convention. Conversely, a carriage without such an agreed stop-
ping place between territories subject to the sovereignty of a Power,
not a member of this Convention, is not deemed to be an international
flight for the purposes of this Convention. Article 1 also provides that
the carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers'" is deemed,
for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided carriage, if it
has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, and it does not
lose its international character merely because one contract or a series
of contracts are to be performed entirely within a territory subject to
the sovereignty of the same High Contracting Party. Finally, it should
be borne in mind, however, that the Convention does not apply to in-
ternational transportation that may be "performed by the United
States.""
III. WILFUL MISCONDUCT
The Warsaw Convention provides that in case of disaster on inter-
national flight, the liability of the air carrier is limited to $8,300.0012
kin v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 1956 U.S. & C. Av. R. 383 (Super. N.J. L.
Div. 1956); Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 1 K.B. 50 (C.A. 1936).
9. In Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ga. 1964),
the Convention was held applicable to a "charter" flight from the United States to France
and return and where each passenger was issued a ticket that referred to the Convention's
liability limitation.
10. The Guadalajara Convention of 1961, supplementary of the Warsaw Convention,
when in force, would introduce particular rules relating to international carriage by air
performed by a carriage other than the contracting carrier. See 28 J. Am L. & Cox. 45,
373 (1961-1962).
11. United States reservation to article 2 of the Convention. Additional Protocol 49
Stat. 3025 (1929).
In a very recent decision, Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.
1965), the court held the Convention applicable to a charter flight of "military" personnel
from the United States to Japan. The flight was performed "for" and not "by" the United
States, the court concluded.
12. Supra note 3. To escape the $8,300 liability, the carrier must prove that he and
his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible
to prevent its happening, Convention art. 20; Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp.
486 (D.N.J. 1957); Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., supra note 8. In Mertens v.
Flying Tiger Line, Inc., supra note 11, where the ticket was delivered to the plaintiff-
decedent when he had boarded the plane, the court found the Convention's liability limita-
1965]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
unless it can be shown that the plaintiff's damages were the consequence
of the carrier's wilful misconduct."8 The burden of proving wilful mis-
conduct and that it was the proximate cause or a substantial factor in
the result which ensued is on the plaintiff. 4
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen,"5 the Court of Appeals defined
wilful misconduct as follows:
The intentional performance of an act with the knowledge that
the performance of that act is likely to cause harm, or the in-
tentional performance of an act in such manner as to imply wan-
ton or careless disregard for its probable consequences.
In addition, the Court cited with approval a very short definition
of wilful misconduct to the effect that "conscious omissions to discharge
a positive duty necessary to the safety of others" constitute grounds for
wilful misconduct. 6
In Pekelis v. Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc.," the court
said that:
Wilful misconduct, likewise, is the intentional omission of some
act, with knowledge that such omission will probably result in
damage or injury, or the intentional omission of some act in a
manner from which could be implied reckless disregard of the
probable consequences of the omission.
It should be observed, that in the latter case the court rejected the
short definition cited in Ulen, on the grounds that "it fails to require
either that the actor knows that his duty was necessary to safety or that
his failure to perform it would amount to recklessness."
tion inapplicable on grounds that the ticket was not "adequately" delivered as provided
in article 3(2). The ticket, the court reasoned, must be delivered to the passenger in such
a manner as to afford him a reasonable opportunity to take measures to protect himself
against the limitation of liability; namely: (1) deciding not to take the flight; (2) enter-
ing into a special contract with the carrier providing for a higher limitation of liability
(art. 22); or (3) taking out additional insurance for the flight.
13. Convention art. 25 provides:
(1) the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this Con-
vention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful
misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the
Court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful mis-
conduct.
(2) Similarly, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said pro-
visions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent of
the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.
See generally Guerreri, Willul Misconduct in the Warsaw Convention: A Stumbling Block?,
6 McGML L.J. 267 (1960).
14. Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
989 (1956); Horobin v. British Overseas Airways Corp. (1952), 2 All. E.R. 1016 (Q.B.).
15. 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
16. Rowe v. Gatke, 126 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1942).
17. 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
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Admittedly, Article 25 of the Convention as it appears translated
from the original French has been the subject of a great deal of litiga-
tion. In Ulen, the defendant-appellant contended that the words dol ou
d'une faute qui, d'apr s la loi du tribunal saisi, est considgrge comme
equivalent au dol' as they appear in the original French of the Conven-
tion, have been inaccurately translated into "wilful misconduct." Dol"9
implies a deliberate design to cause a result. The advocates of such argu-
ment claim that the carrier must be guilty of "well-nigh criminal intent"
before Article 25 has application.2"
In spite of the letter and spirit of Article 25, courts in the United
States have not agreed that such language should be construed to that
extent.21 Its wording-d'apr s la loi du tribunal saisi 2-left to the
jurisdiction seized of the case to decide whether or not a particular fault
is to be given the effect of dol and to remove the limitation of the car-
rier's liability.3
The draftors of the Warsaw Convention, however, intended to as-
similate jaute lourde and dol.2" While it may embrace intentional as
well as unintentional acts, jaute lourde can be established in abstracto
by reference to the standard conduct required from a reasonable prudent
man (or bon pere de jamille) without requiring the determination of the
wrongdoer's state of mind. 5
18. These words have been translated into art. 25 as "wilful misconduct or by such
default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is sub-
mitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct."
19. From Latin. In civil law dolus imports fraud or deceit; any subtle contrivance by
words or acts with a design to circumvent. Dolus differs from culpa in that the latter im-
ports error, negligence, heedlessness, or temerity, as well as indirect intention (i.e., conse-
quence intended but not desired), while to constitute the former there must be a will or
intention to do wrong. BOUVIER, LAW DIc'rioNARY (8th ed. 1914). The Romans considered
the culpa lata as enacted in the civil law systems as equivalent to dolus, mainly for psy-
chological reasons; the culpa lata being so reckless and enormous. See generally Guerreri,
Wilful Misconduct in the Warsaw Convention: A Stumbling Block?, supra note 13.
It is submitted, that it seems doubtful, however, whether the general use of the word
dolus in the civil law is not rather that of very great negligence, than of fraud as used in
the common law.
20. American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, supra note 15.
21. With the exception of Froman v. Pan American Airways, 284 App. Div. 935, 135
N.Y.S.2d 619 (1st Dep't 1954), leave to appeal denied, 308 N.Y. 1050, 125 N.E.2d 434
(1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955), where the court held that wilful misconduct
appears to require that the act of the carrier or its employees be intentionally done.
22. Supra note 18.
23. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, 219 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), rev'd, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965). The Court of Appeals' reversal was predicated
mainly on the ground that in holding the defendant airlines guilty of wilful misconduct as
a "matter of law," the trial court substituted itself for the jury and drew its own inferences
from the facts. In addition, it should be mentioned that it was also found error to hold
that the Second Circuit does not require "knowledge" that damage would probably result,
as a necessary element of wilful misconduct.
24. RomE CONVENTION, 1933. Faute lourde has been translated as "gross negligence."
See generally D~aoN, LnvITATION OF LIABI.ITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW (1954).
25. Supra note 23.
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In summary, in the United States the "intent""8 of the actor to
cause the result is not an element to predicate wilful misconduct or gross
negligence under the Warsaw Convention. However, the courts have been
very reluctant to hold an air carrier liable of wilful misconduct. This
is evidenced by the fact that the verdict for the plaintiff in excess of the
Convention limit was sustained prior to 1961 in only one instance. 7
A. The Violation of an Air Safety Regulation
In that one case exceeding the Convention limits prior to 1961
American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen,2s the plaintiffs were passengers on a
flight from Washington, D.C. to Mexico City, Mexico, which crashed a
few hours after take-off. The evidence showed that the air carrier's au-
thorized and experienced agent had drawn a flight plan which called
for the aircraft to fly at an altitude of 4,000 feet along the route where
the crash happened. The "flight log"2 9 indicated that the flight plan was
being carefully observed at the time of the accident. It was also estab-
lished that the aircraft crashed at an altitude of 3,910 feet. In contrast,
it should be noticed that in accordance with the air safety regulation 0
in effect at the time, the aircraft was supposed to be flown, within the
intended route, at least but not less than 5,000 feet of altitude. As an
aggravating circumstance, interrogatories answered by the defendant
air carrier showed that the "same pilot had flown this same route in the
same manner several times before."
The obvious and sole purpose of the civil air regulation in effect at
the time of this accident was the "safety of the passengers and the air-
craft in a likely situation." In this respect, the Court said, "it imposes
a duty upon all the scheduled air carriers."
Faced with this predicament, the Court held that the defendant's
flight plan was a deliberate and intentional violation of that duty which
26. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, supra note 23; Pekelis v. Trans-
continental & Western Air, Inc., supra note 17, where the court specifically held that wilful
misconduct does not require that the actor intends to cause the ensuing result.
27. Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., supra note 17, and see quotation
in text at 15 infra; Ritts v. American Overseas Airways, Inc., 1949 U.S. & C. Av. R. 65
(S.D.N.Y.), and Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 281 App. Div. 105, 111, 117
N.Y.S.2d 276, 281 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd mem., 305 N.Y. 830, 114 N.E.2d 37 (1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 874 (1953), arising out of the same crash, see quotation in text at note
33, infra; Rashap v. American Airlines, Inc., 1955 U.S. & C. Av. R. 593 (S.D.N.Y.), see
quotation in text at note 35, infra; Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., supra note 14, and see
quotation in text at note 36, infra.
28. Supra note 15.
29. "Flight log" is an airborne device which automatically records on a screen or map
the information concerning a particular flight, such as miles flown, altitudes of flight, air
speed, temperature, winds, etc. ADAMS, AERONAUTICAL DICTIONARY 75 (1959).
30. Civil Air Reg. 61.7401, effective May 7, 1943, 8 Fed. Reg. 6589. "No scheduled air
carrier aircraft shall be flown at an altitude of less than 1000 feet above the highest ob-




caused the result complained by the plaintiff. Furthermore, it was also
determined that the course intended to be flown at such planned altitude,
if successfully carried out, would have passed within 2 mile or at the
most 2 miles from the point of impact. Under such circumstances, the
Court held further, "it requires no stress of imagination to visualize what
could happen and what did happen."
This, the Court added, does not mean that the mere violation of an
air safety regulation constitutes by itself wilful misconduct."' In Ritts
v. American Overseas Airways, Inc.,32 the jury's finding of wilful mis-
conduct was reversed on appeal. In limiting liability to $8,300, the Court,
in effect, found no violation of the alleged air safety regulation, and held,
in the alternative, that even if there had been a violation, the plaintiff
had not established it as the "proximate cause""8 of the accident.
In addition, it should be taken into consideration as determinative
factors, 4 (1) the seriousness of the consequences intended to be pre-
vented by the regulation, (2) the degree of probability of these conse-
quences as a result of the violation, and (3) the interest intended to be
protected by such regulation. In other words, a line should be drawn
to determine whether a violation of an air safety regulation which has
met the requirements set forth previously may or may not constitute
grounds for wilful misconduct.
Accordingly, in Rashap v. American Airlines, Inc.,8" where, in the
process of landing a plane with a feathered engine, the wing flaps were
inclined to a degree that violated a regulation, it was not deemed under
the circumstances to warrant a finding of wilful misconduct. Nor was
wilful misconduct established in Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 6 aris-
ing out of the same crash as Rashap, where one officer shut off an engine
31. Normally a violation of a "safety" regulation gives rise to negligent actions. Negli-
gence is merely a departure from a standard of conduct required by the law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. The standard of conduct may be
one set by the common law as the traditional standard of the reasonable man of ordinary
prudence or it may be laid down by the regulation. In short, negligence is the breach of a
legal duty imposed by the rule of common law or by the particular statute or regulation.
On the other hand, "negligence per se" is not "liability per se." At the most a violation of
a "safety" regulation may constitute conclusive evidence of negligence, or, in other words,
"negligence per se." Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947).
See also Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Conven-
tion, 7 J. AIR L. & Com. 1 (1936), for the proposition that there is wilful misconduct
"per se" when violation of a safety regulation leads to an accident.
32. Supra note 27; and Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., arising out of the
same crash, at same note supra.
33. PROSSER, TORTS § 252 (2d ed. 1955). "Proximate cause or legal cause is the name
given to the limitation which the courts have compelled to place, as a practical necessity,
upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct. The connection between
the duty or obligation which the defendant owes, or does not owe, to the plaintiff and the
ultimate consequence of the defendant's act has been deemed as proximate cause."
34. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., supra note 31.
35. Supra note 27.
36. Supra note 14.
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at the same time the pilot attempted to gain altitude to make another
approach. "The plane was 'in extremis,' whatever the first officer did or
failed to do was done to save the aircraft and the lives of all on board
including his own."
In Pekelis, however, the defendant's faulty installation of an "al-
timeter" was not considered grounds for wilful misconduct, despite of
the seriousness of the violation and its causal relationship with the en-
suing result.
In summary, wilful misconduct existed in all its elements in Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen. In the "flight plan" (which called for an al-
titude not sufficient to fly over the point of impact) as well as in the
"executing of the flight" (no attempt by the pilot to increase altitude in
spite of the fact that he had flown this same route several times before),
and considering the regulation in force, the case clearly fell within the
range of Article 25 of the Convention. This was, indeed, a sound deci-
sion.
B. The Non-Violation of an Air Safety Regulation
In the case of Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V.KLM v.
Tuller, 7 a finding of wilful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention
was again upheld by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on each
of the four allegations of the plaintiff. In this case, the decedent was a
passenger on a flight from Amsterdam to New York which crashed in the
waters of the Shannon River, Ireland,"5 some 7,000 feet from the end of
the airport runway. The decedent and another passenger escaped from
the plane through a rear window and stood on the tail of the aircraft
without life preservers awaiting rescue. Four hours later, just as a rescue
launch was approaching and after all other passengers and crew mem-
bers had made their way to safety, in rubber boats, the decedent lost
his footing, fell off the tail, and drowned.
The first allegation of wilful misconduct was that the defendant air
carrier "failed to properly instruct the passengers about the location of
the life vest." An air safety regulation of the Irish government "does not
require life vest instructions unless a flight is more than 30 minutes travel
from land." The accident happened approximately within one minute
after take-off, therefore, it cannot be said that a regulation was violated.
37. 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 921 (1961).
38. Article 28 of the Convention deals specifically with the question of judicial jurisdic-
tion. Four specific jurisdictional contracts are provided, three relating to the carrier, and
the last based on the place of destination: (1) court of the domicile of the carrier; (2)
carrier's principal place of business; (3) where carrier has a place of business through which
the contract has been made; and (4) before the court at the place of destination. In Tuller,
the decision is silent as to jurisdiction. But presumably the ticket was bought in Wash-
ington, D.C., thus giving jurisdiction to the Court within art. 28. See McKenry, Judicial
Jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention, 29 J. Aia L. & Com. 205 (1963).
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However, since the evidence showed that the defendant was alive within
seconds before the rescue launch reached the aircraft, the jury inferred
that if the decedent had been wearing a life vest, his life could have been
saved.
As to this allegation, the court held "that the failure to instruct the
passengers as to the location of the life vest was a conscious and wilful
omission to perform a positive duty and constituted reckless disregard
of its consequences." In addition, the court held further "that we are
not bound by the limits of the Irish government's regulations as to when
the life vest instructions should be given to fulfill the duty of care owed
to passengers."39
It seems evident that the court predicated its findings of wilful mis-
conduct, as to this allegation, on the failure of the crew members to
"anticipate the gravity of the harm" which would follow an emergency
landing on water, particularly on a night flight which contemplated land-
ing and take-off at at least two airports near the sea.
The second allegation was that the radio operator failed to fasten
his seat belt, fell off his seat during the descent and was unable to send
a "distress message." The court held that there was no attempt to send
a message "either before or after" the crash, in spite of the fact that the
plane had three workable radios at three different positions.
The third allegation, the failure of the crew members to assist the
passenger and abandon him at his peril, was held sufficient on the grounds
that the crew, knowing the decedent was on the tail of the aircraft await-
ing rescue, did not make sufficient effort under the circumstances to res-
cue him, despite the fact that "various alternatives were available at
the time."
Finally, the court upheld the fourth allegation, the "unawareness"
of the ground agent of the defendant air carrier of the loss of radio con-
tact with the aircraft and its delay to initiate prompt search and rescue
operations when he had learned about the crash. These, the court held,
"'were conscious omissions to discharge a positive duty necessary to the
safety of the passengers." Prompt rescue could have prevented the de-
cedent's death who was alive just before the rescue launch arrived.
There has been speculation whether this decision constituted an
expansion of the concept of wilful misconduct. A close scrutiny of the
most relevant cases involving wilful misconduct would reveal that the
court in Tuller adhered, excepting the first allegation, to the letter of the
standard conception of wilful misconduct" given in Ulen, in spite of the
39. Horobin v. British Overseas Airways Corp., supra note 14.
40. In both Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., supra note 27 and Grey v.
American Airlines, Inc., supra note 14, the court said:
[I]n order that an act may be characterized as wilful, there must be on the part
1965]
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fact that it relies also on a short definition "suggested" in that case to
the effect that "conscious omissions to discharge a positive duty necessary
to the safety of others" constitute grounds for wilful misconduct.
4 1
However, if we analyze this case carefully, we will be able to as-
certain that the real basis of the court's ruling was the "public nature"
of the duties of a common carrier and the duties of the crew members
toward "common carrier passengers." It is evident that under the cir-
cumstances they had the means available to perform such duties up to
the standard required from them; but they did not.
C. An Objective, not a Subjective Test
The "intent" of the actor to cause the result is not an element to
predicate wilful 'misconduct or gross negligence under the Warsaw Con-
vention. In Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd.,42 the
court held further that:
it is enough if he acted freely knowing or having reason to know
of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that his
conduct not only created an unreasonable risk of harm to the
passengers, but also involve a high degree of probability that
substantial harm would result to the aircraft and the passengers
by the doing or failing to do the act in question.
In this case, the plaintiff-decedent was a passenger for hire in a
flight between Sidney, Australia, and San Francisco, California, with
intermediate scheduled stops at Nandy, Figi Island, Canton Island, and
Honolulu, which crashed near Half Moon Bay, California, on October
29, 1953. Reports prior and after the crash failed to reveal any evidence
of mechanical failure or malfunction which might have indicated that
the aircraft was not air-worthy at the time of the disaster.
Three times, the San Francisco Airport Control Tower directed the
pilot as follows:
"Maintain at least 500 feet above all clouds, contact San Fran-
cisco approach control after passing the Half Moon Bay fan
of the person sought to be charged a "conscious intent to do or omit doing" the
act from which harm results to another, or an intentional omission of a manifest
duty. There must be a realization of the probability of injury from the conduct,
and a disregard of the probable consequences of such conduct.
SHAwcRoss & BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 364 (2d ed. 1951):
[WIilful misconduct means a deliberate act or omission which the person doing or
omitting (1) knows is a breach of his duty in the circumstances, or (2) knows
is likely to cause injury to third parties, or (3) with reckless indifference does
not know or care whether it is or is not a breach of his duty or is likely to cause
damage. . . . It is essential to remember that "the misconduct," not the conduct,
must be wilful.
41. Supra note 16.
42. Sup a note 23.
[VOL. XIX
WILFUL MISCONDUCT
marker.43 Cloud tops reported in the bay area 1,700 feet." He
was also instructed to proceed "direct from the Half Moon
Bay fan marker to the Instrument Landing System (ILS)"
outer marker 45 before descending."
These "clearances" were given by voice, acknowledged and read
back by the pilot, but they were not carried out. King's Mountain, the
crash site, was between the two markers but not on a direct line and
was "below" the minimum permitted altitude.
In spite of the fact that the pilot did not observe the clearance in-
structions and instead veered from his assigned course and descended into
the clouds before he properly established the airliner's position over the
outer marker, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and awarded
nothing to the decedent's estate. On Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
non obstante veredicto and a new trial limited to damages, granted.
In the most recent case, Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines,"
the question of "intent" came before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. In that case, the decedent was an international
passenger on a flight from Brussels to Rome that crashed into a moun-
tain-side northeast of Rome on February 13, 1955. It was established
that the flight plan called for the -aircraft to fly within a ten-mile wide
airway from Florence to Rome.
The site of the crash, thirty miles east of the airway, and the trans-
cript of the radio conversation between the Sabena plane and Rome,
revealed that the pilot did not follow the flight plan instructions. In-
stead, the Sabena crew deliberately misled the Rome controller of their
position in order to avoid the delay in landing that the Rome controller
would have required had they reported that they were uncertain of their
position.
The plaintiff did not contend that the plane was off-course as a
result of wilful misconduct. Rather, he contended that the Sabena crew's
misrepresentation caused the Rome controller to authorize a descent
that, though it would have been safe within the established airway, was
fatal over the mountainous country to the east where the plane was theft
flying.
43. "Fan marker" is a location marker that transmits a fan shaped radiation pattern
in a vertical direction. Fan markers used in an Instrument Landing System (ILS) indi-
cate distance to the runway. See ADAMS, supra note 29.
44. "Instrument Landing System" is a radio guidance and communication system
designed to guide aircraft through approaches, let downs, and landings under conditions
of little or no visibility. The ILS consists essentially of directional transmitters establish-
ing the angle of the glide path and indicating the direction of the runway, and of radio
marker beacons establishing locations along the approach path. ADAMs, supra note 29.
45. "Outer marker" is the outermost location marker from the end of the runway.
See ADA s, supra note 29.
46. 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965).
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Finally, the plaintiff's theory was heavily supported by the "range"
of the Viterbo radio beacon4 7 that marks the flight's airway from Flor-
ence to Rome. The evidence showed that the plane's position when its
crew reported that it passed the Viterbo beacon, was more than 30 miles
from the beacon. In contrast, it was also established that the maximum
range at which a radio compass4" would home on the beacon was only
about 22 miles.
In the sub-judice cases, the courts' reasonings seem to be predicated
on the grounds that the pilots' acts were creatures of their "free choice"
and even though they did not intend the harm, they elected not to ob-
serve the clearance instructions with careless disregard for their conse-
quences. A violation, the court concluded, the actors knew or had reason
to know would create an unreasonable risk of harm which, in fact, was
the proximate cause of the disaster.
As in Ulen, the "clearance instruction's sole and obvious purpose
was intended to protect the passengers and the aircraft from a likely
accident." It is, indeed, a case within the ambit of Article 25 of the Con-
vention.
D. Rate of Descent
Generally, out of record cases do not exceed much above the mini-
mum amount of $8,300.00 provided in Article 17 of the Convention.
Capehart v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (AVIANCA), "9 was
a rare exception to the general rule. In this case, the decedents were
passengers on a flight from New York City to Bogota, Colombia, with
scheduled stops at Miami, and Montego Bay, Jamaica. On January 20,
1960, in landing at Montego Bay Airport, the aircraft, "a Lockheed
Super Constellation," crashed, skidded down the runway, rolled over on
its 'back, caught fire, and burned. All the passengers, save four, were
killed and the majority of the crew, five out of seven, escaped without
injury. Among them, the pilot, co-pilot, and flight engineer made their
way out to safety through the cockpit exit.
The plaintiffs' main contentions were that (1) the crew members
failed to assist the passengers during the emergency caused upon land-
ing and abandoned the passengers at their perils while the plane was in
47. "Radio beacon" is any radio transmitter, together with its associated equipment,
that emits signals enabling the determination, by means of suitable receiving equipment,
of direction, distance, or position with respect to the beacon. ADAMs, supra note 29.
48. "Radio compass" is a direction-indicating radio-receiving apparatus used aboard
aircraft, which makes use of directional characteristics of a loop antenna for finding and
indicating direction in relation to a radio-transmitting station to which the receiver is
tuned. Radio compasses are used in homing on a transmitting station and in obtaining
bearings and fixes. ADAmS, supra note 29.
49. Unreported, docket No. 10,315-M-Civil-E.C. (1963). The United States District
Court for the Fifth Circuit rendered judgment on verdict of $227,000 for plaintiffs. On
appeal, it was compromised to $200,000.
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flames, and (2) in landing at Montego Bay Airport the aircraft exceeded
far above the designed maximum "rate of descent"5 for this type of
airplane (10 feet per second with a maximum of 12).
A sequence of facts were alleged and rolled together in support of
these allegations.51 The crew members of this aircraft were not sup-
posed to be on duty longer than ten hours.5" The evidence showed that
at the time of landing, the crew had been on duty for some 19 hours and
10 minutes. They were so tired that the pilot misjudged the landing ap-
proach altitude and instead of executing a "missed approach"5" he chose
to "dive"5 4 the aircraft. The "rate of descent" was so great that the
craft did not "flare-out"55 but hit the runway with such tremendous im-
pact that it broke one of its wings right off and destroyed the landing
gear.
By circumstantial evidence,"6 it was proved that the rate of descent
of this aircraft was such that the pilot and co-pilot would have to know
about it by looking at the instruments they had in the cockpit panel. Un-
der such circumstances, the plaintiffs alleged, the pilot had a "choice"
to execute a "missed approach" or to attempt to land the aircraft at such
altitude. He chose to "dive" the aircraft, thus causing the alleged re-
sult.
The jury's finding of wilful misconduct sustained plaintiffs' conten-
tion that in landing the aircraft at the proven rate of descent, the pilot
exercised a "free choice" which was an intentional act on his part with
certain degree of knowledge of its probable consequences. The pilot's
choice, as in Ulen and Berner, constituted a violation of a "rate-of-de-
50. "Rate of descent" is the rate at which an aircraft descends, i.e., the vertical com-
ponent of its air speed in descending. ADAms, supra note 29.
51. It should be remembered that each allegation of wilful misconduct has to be
considered and proved separately. See Horobin v. British Overseas Airways Corp., supra
note 14.
52. By Special Civil Air Reg. No. SR-405 (1954), the crew flight limitation in trans-
continental nonstop operations were extended by the board from eight to ten hours after
it was found to have no adverse effect on safety operations. See also Certification and
Operation of Flag Air Carriers, 29 Fed. Reg. 19186 (Dec. 31, 1964).
53. "Approach" is an act or instance of bringing an aircraft in to a landing, or of an
aircraft coming in to a landing, including flying a landing pattern and descending, as, to
begin an approach, or, to make a landing in the first approach. ADAMS, supra note 29.
54. "Dive" is an act or instance of an aircraft descending nose downward, its longi-
tudinal axis remaining substantially coincident with its line of flight. ADAMS, supra note. 29.
55. "Flare-out" is to descend in a smooth curve in landing, making a transition from
a steep descent to a direction of flight substantially parallel to the surface. ADAMS, supra
note 29.
56. "When necessity for resort to circumstantial evidence arises either from the nature
of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, considerable latitude is allowed in the re-
ception of circumstantial evidence." 20 Am. JuR., Evidence § 271 (1939).
In a very recent case, Green v. Reynolds Metals Co., 328 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1964), the
court held that "proof of negligence may be made out completely with circumstantial
evidence, and if there is evidence that points to any plausible theory of causation, there
is basis for recovery."
1965]
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scent" regulation for this type of aircraft, which was intended for the
"safety" of the passengers and the aircraft in a likely situation.
It should be noticed that in the instant case, the first allegation of
the plaintiffs was disregarded by the jury's finding of wilful misconduct.
In Tuller, the factual situation differs to some extent. In the former,
the evidence showed that the aircraft was in flames. To this extent, the
jury in the Capehart case accepted defendant's contention that the crew
"did not have means available at the time," as it was the situation under
Tuller.
E. Civil Aeronautics Board's Reports
In an action for wrongful death under the Warsaw Convention,
Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 7 the decedent was a passenger for
hire on a flight that crashed near Imeson Airport, Jacksonville, Florida,
in the early morning hours of December 21, 1955. The plaintiff's theory
was that due to the steadily increasing weather deterioration in the air-
port vicinity, the flight's crew came in at an excessive rate of speed at-
tempting to land before the airport closed down.
The evidence indicates that the pilot was making an Instrument
Landing System (ILS) approach to the runway. In doing so, the pilot
flew below his "glide slope""8 and authorized minimum59 ceiling and visi-
bility required for an "ILS" approaching. At this time, its "angle of de-
scent" (22 degrees) and its "rate of descent" (at ten feet per second),
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the aircraft was under absolute
control of the crew.
Based upon expert testimony, the plaintiff's main contention was
that the pilot took a calculated risk and deliberately and intentionally
flew the aircraft below the "glide slope" during his "ILS" approach.
This, the plaintiff contended, caused the result complained of.
The United States District Court sustained plaintiff's contention
and rendered judgment on verdict for the plaintiff on grounds of wilful
misconduct. On appeal it was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The court held "that expert testimony based upon Civil Aeronautics
57. 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 895 (1963).
58. "Glide slope" is, essentially, a radio beam that gives slope control-elevation
control--at a pre-set angle of approach to the end of the runway and indicates to the
pilot whether or not he is at the correct elevation as he comes in for his approach.
ADAMs, supra note 29.
59. "Minimums" refer to the weather minimums--required ceiling and visibility
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Board. ADA s, supra note 29.
"The minimums for an aircraft of this type (constellation) on an ILS approach were
200 foot ceiling and 1/2 mile visibility. If the pilot has reached the 200 foot level and
does not have visual reference to the ground, he must execute a 'missed approach.' When




Board (CAB) Reports"0 which express agency views as to the probable
cause of the accident is barred from being admitted as evidence or use
in any action, drawing out of any matter mentioned in such reports."'"
Since the expert testimony in the instant case was predicated upon CAB
reports, the admission of such evidence, the court added, was "substan-
tially prejudicial to the defendant."' 2
Despite the unequivocal words of the statute, it was argued that
Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc.,'8 establishes, a contrario sensu, that the
CAB rule does not prohibit a CAB investigator to testify from his per-
sonal observation about the scene of the crash and the condition of the
plane after the accident. This, however, the court concluded, blurs the
essential policy and reason behind Section 1441(e).*"
In the last two cases, the courts' findings of wilful misconduct were
predicated substantially upon the same basis; the pilot's "free choice"
to execute the landing of the aircraft under the circumstances. In both
cases, the pilot had the free choice of executing a "missed approach."
The distinguishing factor was reflected in the Berguido case where the
plaintiff's expert testimony was based upon CAB Reports; whereas, in
the Capehart case, the plaintiffs' contention of wilful misconduct was
predicated strictly upon circumstantial evidence. It was, indeed, a great
difference.
IV. CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing decisions, it may 'be concluded that no
matter what kind of violation encompasses the alleged circumstances-
whether an air safety regulation or otherwise-in order to determine
whether the air carrier's misconduct is within the ambit of Article 25 of
the Convention, we must ascertain (1) the actor's duty under the cir-
cumstances; (2) whether the actor's misconduct was creature of his
"free choice"; and (3) whether that free choice was a "flagrant" viola-
tion of a duty intended to protect the kind of interest proximately af-
fected as a result of the disaster.
As stated, the "intent" to cause the result is not an element to pred-
icate wilful misconduct. The actor's conduct can be established "in ab-
60. Civil Aeronautics Act, § 1441(e), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (Supp. 1962) (herein-
after referred to as CAB). Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951) ;
Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Ratner
v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
61. Supra note 60; to the same tenor, Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
and Ratner v. Arrington, supra note 60.
62. Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
275 U.S. 895 (1963).
63. 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951); Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., supra
note 27.
64. Supra note 60.
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stracto" by reference to the standard conduct required from a reason-
able prudent man (or bon pere de famille) under similar circumstances.6 5
Similarly, absolute knowledge that the result would ensue is not re-
quired. It would be sufficient if the actor knew or had reason to know
his "choice" would create an unreasonable risk of harm, which, in fact,
was the proximate cause of the accident."6
From the practitioner's point of view, these cases show also that
wilful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention is far from impossi-
ble. Its most common enemy is the "directed verdict." However, once
you have passed by it, it may not be too difficult to communicate to the
jurors the concept and elements embraced in the misconduct.
65. Supra note 26.
66. Ibid.
